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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
FAYETTE QUARTERLY COURT*
EUBANK S ~anCE STATION, - - - - Plaintiff,
VS. OPINION
ALrismN MCCL RE, - - - - - Defendant.
This case is submitted to the Court on demurrer of the
defendant to the second paragraph of the plaintiff's petition.
The question is, "Does Section 2739h-1 of the Kentucky Statutes
give a dealer a lien for gasoline and oil purchased to operate an
automobile 9 "
Counsel for the defendant have cited a very able opinion
rendered by Judge Richard C. Stoll in the case of Esther Bell
Brown v Mrs. H. H. (Margaret C.) Wilson. Tins opinion dis-
cusses the various lien Statutes of this State and in Ins usually
clear and convincing manner Judge Stoll gives a very logical
interpretation of the Statute m question. Counsel for the
defendant did not argue that the opinions of the Circuit Court
are binding on Quarterly Courts but tins Court would be reluc-
tant indeed to adopt a different construction of a Statute from
that placed upon it by the Fayette Circuit Court unless the
Court of Appeals had in that or some other case reached a dif-
ferent conclusion or unless tins Court was firmly convinced that
the Circuit Court vas in error, especially is tins true when the
decision in the Circuit Court has been rendered by a jurist of
the experience and ability of Judge Stoll.
However, Judge Stoll's opinion in the Brown case was
rendered a number of years ago and in so far as the record before
me discloses he may have, at a later date, after more extended
experience and with a riper legal knowledge and with the insight
and legal intuition which comes from long service on the bench,
have reached a different conclusion. Also there may have been
decisions of the Court of Appeals since that time winch, while
not exactly in point, might have a tendency to influence Judge
Stoll's pinion were he writing an opinion on tlns question today
* This opinion by Judge Adams, Judge Fayette Quarterly Court,
reaching the same conclusion as Judge Stoll supra, as to whether a Hen
exists on a motor vehicle for oil and gas furnished for its transporta-
tion is also printed.
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Therefore, without wishing to seem presumptuous, I will
endeavor to test Judge Stoll's opinion by the general rules of
construction which are to be followed in interpreting a Statute
and with such help as can be secured from the decisions of the
Court of Appeals of this and other States which serve to throw
light upon the question, together with the suggestions contained
in the excellent briefs in the case, will try to reach what I con-
sider a true interpretation of the Statute.
The defendant relies almost entirely upon the aforesaid
opinion of Judge Stoll. The plaintiff relies largely upon the
case of Willis v Lafayette-Phoemnx Garage, 202 Ky 554, 260
S. 'W 364. At the outset I was interested to know if the opinion
of the Court of Appeals in the latteil case was rendered prior or
subsequent to the opinion of the Cireuit Court in the Brown
case.
If the Lafayette-Phoenix case is as much in point as the
plaintiff contends it is, if it was rendered after Judge Stoll's
opinion it might be argued that it would overrule his opinion.
If it had been decided when he rendered his opinion it is fair to
assume that he did not regard it as an authority on this question
because he does not refer to it.
Construing the omission of the attorneys for the defendant
to furish this information most strongly against them, I will
assume that the Lafayette-Phlinix Garage case was decided after
Judge Stoll's decision in the Brown case.
A number of cases have been cited which construe other lien
statutes but these cases do not shed much light upon the question
before us. They are decided from the wording of various stat-
utes and they vary to such an extent that I will not refer to them
at tis time, except the Statute giving a lien to a person who
feeds or grazes horses, which I will refer to later in connection
with the Mid-Continental Petroleum Corporation case, cited by
the attorney for the plaintiff.
The Lafayette-Phenix Garage case is concerned primarily
with the constitutionality of the automobile lien act and whether
it violates the due process section of the United States Constitu-
tion. It quotes at length from the New Jersey case of Crucible
,Steel Company v. Polack Tyre & Rubber Co.. 92 N. J. Law. 221,
104 Atlantic 324. In the quotation from said opinion we find
these words referring to the New Jersey Motor Lien Statute
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"It gmes a right of lien for furnshiung gasoline, accessores or
other supplies for motor vehicles."
Counsel for plaintiff stresses the fact that tins opinion says
that a lien is given for "gasoline" However, upon reading the
New Jersey case in full you will find that the Section of the
New Jersey Statute which is construed in that case reads in
part as follows.
"All -persons or corporations engaged in the business of keeping
a garage or place for the storage, maintenance, keeping or repair of
motor vehicles and in connection therewith stores, maintains, keeps
or repairs any motor vehicles or furnishes gasoline, accessories or
other supplies therefor at the request or with the consent of the owner,"
etc. Comp, Supp., pp. 898, 899, Sees. 7-9.
The word "gasoline" is used in the Statute, it being
expressly said that the garage owner has a lien for gasoline.
The man who wrote the New Jersey Motor Lien law must have
been at some time interested in gasoline business because the
Statute creates a lien for furnishing "gasoline, accessores and
other supplies." He mentioned "gasoline" first, so that there
could be no doubt that a lien was to be created for the furnislng
of this commodity Therefore, the New Jersey case cannot be
used as an authority in construing the Kentuchy Statutes
because so far as gasoline is concerned, nothing is left to con-
struction in the New Jersey Statute, the word "gasoline" is
written in the Statute.
The plaintiff says that the principle laid down in the Mid-
Continental Petroleum case, 225 Ky 501, 9 S. W (2) 229, is in
favor of his construction that gasoline is embraced in the Ken-
tucky Statutes in the word "supplies" In this case, the Court
held that oil and gasoline used in the operation of machinery in
digging sewer trenches constitute such "material" under the
statute as to entitle persons furnsinng same to a lien upon the
property upon winch the trenches are dug. The discussion of
the case in the opinion and the quotations from the cases cited
in the opinion convince me that the Court allowed the lien in
tins case upon the theory that the oil and gas used in the
machinery, although it did become an integral part of the com-
pleted work, helped in a material way to complete the contract
and the contract when completed resulted in an improvement to
the land. In other words, it seems that materialmen's liens are
allowed on the theory stated in Johnson v. Starrett, 127 Minn.
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138 cited in the Mid-Continental case that "they have contrib-
uted to the improvement of the property"
Going back to the lien given by the Kentucky Statute for
feed and pasture, plaintiff asks the question, "Is not feed and
pasture exactly the same to a horse as gasoline and oil to an
automobile?" The answer to tins question, m the words of
that noted philosopher, Andrew H. Brown, is "Yes and No,
partly yes and partly no, mostly no." It is necessary for a
horse to be fed to sustain its life and keep the animal in a usuable
and salable condition. It is necessary to have gasoline in an
automobile to give it locomotion. But there is a difference, feed
is necessary to the preservation of the horse. It maintains its
life, its strength, its speed, in other words, its value. Gasoline
gives speed and miles to an automobile and speed and miles
depreciate the value of the car. Therefore, there is a vast dif-
ference between the two. The more gasoline is furnished for a
car the more miles it runs, the more miles a car runs the less
valuable it becomes.
I am of the opinion the Statute intended to give a lien only
for such services and such accessories and such supplies as
become a permanent part of the car and winch would have a
tendency to add to its value.
It seems to me the Kentucky Motor Lien Statute is very
explicit and explains clearly the thing for winch it intends to
give a lien, namely, "Repairs, work done, accessories or supplies
furished for or on machines." REPAIRS-Webster's New
International Dictionary defines repairs "state of being restored,
to a sound or good state after decay, waste, injury, etc." Mend-
ing a broken wheel, straightening a bumper or taking a dent out
of a fender comes under the head of "Repairs" "Work done"
would include the mechanical work of putting an accesory on the
automobile and would probably include such work as cleaning a
carburetor, gasoline line, sparks -plug or grinding valves and
such other work as may become necessary on the car from use
and winch are not of a serious enough nature to be classed as
repairs and winch does not result from some accident and which,
therefore, may not be strictly construed as "repairs" ACCES-
SORIES-According to Webster's accessories are "something
additional and subordinate" and as Judge Stoll, in is opinion,.
said, would include spotlights and other equipment that is placed
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on the car after it is purchased and winch are not necessary to
its operation, but winch the owner thinks adds to its convenience.
I also believe that Judge Stoll is correct in Ins mterpreta-
tion of "Supplies", that "supplies" does not include either
accessories or oil and gasoline but the supplies in the way of
new material necessary to repair worn parts, etc.
The Legislature undoubtedly had a right to give a lien upon
an automobile for gasoline and oil purchased to be used in the
car, but in my opinion they failed to do so and I believe that the
most liberal construction placed upon the present Motor Vehicle
Lien Law cannot give the garage man a right of lien for gas and
oil furnished.
The defendant's demurrer to the second paragraph of the
plaintiff's petition is sustained. Counsel will prepare judgment
in accordance with this opinion and it is ordered that tis
opinion be made a part of the record in this case.
CnEisTE. D. ADAMs,
Judge Fayette Quarterly Court.
